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1 Introduction 
In rural southern Africa, access to wild resources is 
critical to livelihoods and various attempts have 
been made by policy-makers to increase the 
income derived from them by poor communities. 
This article examines the resulting existing and 
emerging institutional arrangements in the 
tourisdsafari hunting and forestry sectors and 
assesses their impact on livelihoods. Case studies of 
wildlife and forestry management initiatives 
involving communities are drawn from the 
Sustainable Livelihoods in Southern Africa 
programme study areas: Eastern Cape (South 
Africa), Chiredzi District (Zimbabwe) and 
Zambezia province (Mozambique). Broadly 
speaking, four types of initiative. with different 
emphases, can be identified. These are community 
participation; partnerships or joint ventures 
between communities and the private sector; 
ecoregonal conservation; and redistribution or 
restitution. To an extent these reflect different 
national priorities and contexts and these 
categories are rarely totally differentiated; overlaps 
and continuities exist. However, a key trend, 
particularly in South Africa (which is returned to 
and looked at in more detail in article 6 in Part 111 
of this Bulletin) is the emergence of a number of 
policy approaches that seek to link private sector 
tourism and forestry operations with community 
or local involvement, usually with an emphasis on 
“pro-poor” commercial investment. 
2 Community participation in wild 
resources management 
Southern Africa has long been at the forefront of 
attempts to promote community-based natural 
resource management (CBNRM) (see, for example, 
Hulnie and Murphrec 2001; Arve Benjaminsen el 
( 1 1 .  2002). CBNRM has acquircd the status of 
conventional wisdom in the region, most recently 
spreading to small-scale initiatives and policies in 
Mozambique. Essentially i t  describes arrangements 
for the decentralised sustainable utilisation of wild 
resources. The most high profile CBNRM scheme 
in the region has been Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE 
scheme (Communal Area Management Programme 
for Indigenous Resources), in which district 
councils gained authority over hunting quotas and 
leased them to professional hunting operators. 
Essentially, this was an attempt to disburse wildlife 
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Box 1: A perception of CAMPFIRE 
‘CAMPFIRE money is being looted and little finds its way back to the community If it does, it will not 
be adequate to meet my family’s daily requirements and other necessities. The whole process reduces 
me to the status of a beggar. I am a man! CAMPFIRE is more about the National Park than us. We used 
to hunt and eat meat often, but now there are too many restrictions, yet our crops are being severely 
damaged by problem animals every year and the compensation is too little and untimely.’ 
Source: Mombeshora et al. (2001). 
revenue (from safari hunting and ecotourism) and 
devolve authority to the local level. The central 
tenet of this scheme is that, in contrast to colonial- 
style “fortress conservation”, there should be no 
conflict between the economic survival of 
agricultural communities and foraging needs of 
wildlife; rather, they should complement each 
other (Murphree 1990; Logan and Mosely 2002). 
Communities neighbouring protected areas should 
receive direct benefits from them and have some 
say in wldlife management and use if conservation 
policies are to be effective. 
The SLSA research programme investigated the 
experience of community wildlife management in 
recent years in Zimbabwe’s lowveld (see SLSA 
Research Paper 1). Does it offer a viable alternative 
or even add-on to other livelihood activities? Wards 
4 and 5 of Sangwe communal area in Chiredzi 
District bordering Gonarezhou National Park, for 
example, have CAMPFIRE committees and school 
blocks, clinics, grinding mills, small dams and 
shops have been built with the proceeds. However, 
the scheme’s reputation in Chiredzi has been 
tarnished by corruption scandals and a lack of real 
devolution of power: communities are not involved 
in the sale of hunting rights and are suspicious of 
misappropnation by the council. 
Many people in the area view CAMPFIRE merely as 
another means of enforcing unpopular natural 
resource conservation legislation. Resource 
monitors on each village committee are meant to 
inform the police about anyone they discover 
cutting trees, cultivating streambanks, causing veld 
fires or poisoning watercourses (for fishing). There 
are bitter complaints about damage to property, 
fields and livestock caused by marauding elephants 
and carnivores. Four people have been killed by 
elephants in these wards since 1996 - mainly 
children herding cattle. There have been long time 
lags in dealing with compensation claims and 
compensation that has been paid is regarded as 
insufficient. In this context it remains more 
lucrative to poach than wait for meagre CAMPFIRE 
dividends and, in some cases, poaching can be read 
as, in part, a political demonstration. The 
frustrations of one interviewee, a self-confessed 
poacher, are summed up in Box 1. 
Ostensibly the CAMPFIRE programme has allowed 
multiple resource use in the communal areas of the 
lowveld (wildlife, livestock and crops) and yet its 
dnving philosophy appears to be a conservation 
one not a development one. CAMPFIRE areas are a 
defacto buffer zone aimed at taking the strain off 
protected areas. Further, as some commentators 
have observed, CAMPFIRE is an explicitly non- 
redistributive development model which, 
notwithstanding its participatory rhetoric, 
legitimises the statw quo with regard to land and 
resource ownership. Indeed, it could even be 
argued that it makes way for the expansion of 
commercial wildlife interests into communal areas 
in the guise of public-pnvate partnerships (Hughes 
2001; Wolmer 2001). 
Research in Derre Forest Reserve, Zambezia 
province, also threw up some problems with 
CBNRM as it is being implemented in Mozambique 
(SLSA Research Paper 10). This is a place where 
limited livelihood options exist, and where poverty 
is extreme and wdespread. Gaining access to forest 
resources for livelihoods and incomes is therefore 
critical. In this context, the state, with donor 
support, is seeking to develop a role, albeit limited, 
for communities in forest exploitation. In a portion 
of the forest reserve, designated as a “buffer zone”, 
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Box 2: Amadiba horse and hiking trail: from participatory project to business 
The Amadiba Horse and Hiking trail is a community-based initiative located on South Africa’s Wild 
Coast in the Eastern Cape. The enterprise is run by the Amadiba community, through their established 
organisation. the Amadiba Coastal Community Development Association (ACCODA), with the support 
of a local NGO. The trail has undergone considerable internal changes in the course of its bnef history 
These can be summarised as an increasingly “commercial” (or “business-like”) approach in the way the 
trail relates to its staff and to the wider world, and reduced scope for participation in higher-level 
decision-making. 
Originally the initiative had a very participatory ethic. It was designed to involve the Amadiba people 
in all aspects of running a project, including planning, implementation, management and decision- 
making, with benefits accruing primarily to the community who received jobs as tour guides and camp 
site managers, and revenue from hiring out horses and leasing a camp site to a fly fishing company. 
The approach has had limitations: it has remained a small-scale enterprise catering only to the budget 
international market, it involves intensive NGO support, a long time scale, and has had several 
management problems. The local part-time jobs created are useful supplements but it is not clear that 
residents prefer this small-scale approach to opportunities from formal sector investment. Lack of 
entrepreneurial experience (and perhaps interest) is a constraint, which seems to have been exacerbated 
rather than addressed by the project’s emphasis on community-management. 
However, the initiative has become a flagship pilot project for the development of the tourism sector 
along the length of the Wild Coast and received substantial EU funding which has led to changes. Some 
of these changes are largely symbolic, as in the switch from “staff” to “service providers”, and from 
“project” to “business”, reflecting a change in attitude rather than in substance. Others, such as the 
disbandment of the management committee and the creation of centralised and professionalised 
structures for administration and management, represent a move away from the participatory approach 
that charactensed the trail in its earlier phase. The top-down manner in which the restructuring process 
was initiated and implemented adds weight to the opinions of “service providers” that they now work 
for a conventional business over which they have little control. 
These changes hold out the promise of a more efficiently-run (and thus more marketable and more 
profitable) enterpnse, with enhanced benefits for staff and the wider community. Such potential, 
however, must be set against the increasing centralisation and managerialism that have occurred as part 
of the restructuring process, which runs the risk of endangering the genuinely participative and 
uniquely local qualities that have characterised the trail to date. 
Source: SLSA Research Paper 7 
the potential for the exploitation of non-timber 
forest products and other income-generating 
activities is being investigated, training provided 
(for example in beekeeping). and a strategy for 
reducing bush fires being developed. Local 
ownership of the process through the creation 
and/or strengthening of local institutions to 
provide leadership and the general involvement of 
the community in the management of the project is 
considered to be important. However, there are 
questions about legitimacy and inclusion in 
relation to these institutions and the degree of 
community involvement. Many representatives are 
outsiders from the provincial capital and the 
“community”, who are participating in the 
management seems to translate, in practice. as 
community leaders from pre-existing institutions: 
local government and traditional authorities. This 
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means there is a degree of complementanty, as well 
as the inevitable power struggles, between the new 
and pre-existing institutions. However, the fact that 
the new management institution replicates existing 
power relations and that the membership fee 
excludes the majority of the community who are 
unable to afford it, contributes to a perception that 
it is largely an elite organisation, hence 
contravening the spirit and aims of the natural 
resources management policy framework and 
poverty reduction thrust. 
In South Africa, the recent history of a small, 
community-based tounsm venture in the Eastern 
Cape illustrates a wider trend in the nature of 
policy and institutions for wild resources 
management away from “community” decision- 
making towards an increasingly commercially 
focused model (see below and Box 2) .  
Thus the experience of community-based w l d  
resources management in Sangwe, Derre and the 
Wild Coast throws up several concerns. These 
include: revenue generated can be insufficient to 
compensate for opportunity costs; CBNRM 
institutions may not be representative of many 
members of those communities and community 
participation may be at odds with efforts to 
increase efficiency and profitability. Also donors 
have become increasingly worried about the high 
transactions costs involved in reaching remote 
areas with low population densities, the low 
replicability of these initiatives, and the 
prioritisation of conservation above poverty 
reduction goals in many cases (Livestock and 
Wildlife Advisory Group 2002). 
3 Private-community partnerships 
The neo-liberal model that currently dominates 
development thinking promotes an investment-led 
approach, with the role of the state being to 
provide an enabling environment to stimulate 
private sector involvement.’ This is tempered in 
southern Africa, to some extent, by a government 
and donor discourse on “pro-poor growth”. Wild 
resources are being commercialised, w t h  coastal, 
forest and other “wilderness” areas being marketed 
as tourism assets, and state forests (particularly 
plantations) being privatised. There is also 
increasing pressure on governments to channel 
biodiversity conservation subsidies into 
programmes that stimulate growth and address 
poverty (see SLSA Research Papers 6,s and 18; and 
article 6 in Part 111 of this Bulletin). 
In this context, communities are not simply being 
encouraged to be more business-onented in their 
wild resources management ventures (as at 
Amadiba, see above), but they are being 
encouraged to enter into formal partnerships with 
the pnvate sector. This is reflected in a shift in the 
language of natural resources management in the 
region: CBNRM is giwng way to talk of public- 
pnvate and pnvate-community partnerships or 
joint ventures. This is a more markevgrowth 
focused approach and initiatives are no longer 
exclusively “community-based’’ and are more 
explicitly development rather than conservation 
related, w t h  socio-economic benefits an end in 
themselves, not just an incentive for conservation, 
Governments and donors are starting to treat 
wldlife and forestry issues as part of poverty and 
growth strategies, rather than leaving them to 
conservation departments. This encompasses a 
vanety of initiatives w t h  different emphases but 
which share a common theme: to reconcile 
economic growth and social justice by encouraging 
pnvate sector activity in using forests, wildlife and 
wild resources and, to varylng degrees, to enhance 
the benefits to the poor. 
In southern Africa, this approach is by far the most 
developed in South Africa where initiatives come 
under the label of “black economic empowerment”. 
This is a catch-all phrase for economic growth that 
aims at redistributing benefits and providing 
opportunities to “historically disadvantaged 
indiwduals” (see Part 111). The South African 
government has developed several mechanisms to 
encourage the pnvate sector to provtde knock-on 
benefits to local people. This is easiest to do in 
situations where it is commercialising state assets 
where equity stnngs can be attached to private 
sector bidders. In adjudicating the bids for forestry 
and tounsm concessions,L for example, potential 
economic performance is not the sole criterion. 
Potential pnvate sector concessionaires are asked to 
provide details of specifically how they aim to 
address community development, with preferential 
regard for bids with the strongest economic 
empowerment proposals that focus on uplifting 
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Box 3: Hotel commercialisation in the Eastern Cape, South Africa 
The Eastern Cape Development Corporation (ECDC) is commercialising the string of hotels that it owns 
along the Wild Coast (inherited from Bantustan agencies). This process is seen by ECDC as an 
opportunity to secure land and equity nghts for communities while also developing tourism nodes. In 
principle, the critena for allocating sites to bidders (alongside the credibility of the proposal, fulfilment 
of an environmental impact assessment, and due diligence in the process) include black economic 
empowerment concerns However, limitations on all sides (government capacity, pnvate sector 
investment interest and community expertise and rights) mean that it is progressing slowly. 
Source: S E A  Research Paper 6 
marginalised people (see SLSA Research Papers 8 
and 18). Box 3 provides one such example 
The sort of benefits stipulated include: community 
equity stakes in forest and tourism concessions; 
paying lease fees or revenue shares to communities 
for use of their land, providing preferential 
employment to local people, local out-sourcing, 
procurement and Contracting, and local enterprise 
opportunities and business training and support A 
relatively progressive example of a South Afncan 
forestry concessionaire’s assistance for local 
communities is illustrated in Box 4. 
In Zimbabwe, the implicit or explicit threat from 
the state to expropnate land for resettlement has 
galvanised private sector tourism and safari 
concerns in and around the Save Valley 
Conservancy to provide similar assistance to local 
communities in the form of “neighbour outreach” 
programmes. They have made attempts to employ 
local staff, and source local products, as well as 
spending money on community development 
projects, usually with a wildlifehourism/ 
conservation focus (SLSA Research Paper 1; and see 
article 6, this Bulletin). 
However, in regulating cases of community-pnvate 
partnership, the state does not always have the 
power derived from adjudicating tenders or 
wielding the axe of land designation. The pnvate 
sector is almost always the stronger partner and 
initiator of JOint-VentUreS, with communities often 
relegated to the role of landowner and employee, 
ceding representation to NGOs or community 
leaders in processes that are not always 
transparent. 
This power imbalance is particularly marked in 
Mozambique, where government and communities 
Box 4: Eastern Cape forestry concession, South Africa 
The Hans Merensky consortium successfully bid for the Eastern Cape North plantation package. The 
company has assumed responsibilities for social welfare issues and local business development 
initiatives that are the traditional preserve of government. This has included: 
0 enterpnse support, including helping establish furniture-making companies and sending people for 
training; establishing a charcoal project, school uniform sewng project and local shop; and plans 
to restore an imgation scheme and set up agncultural projects 
local contracting of security operations and pruning and silvlculture work 
0 building a clinic 
aiding in the research and documentation of land claims within the plantation 
Source SLSA Rescarch Paper 6 
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Box 5: Derre Forest Reserve, Mozambique 
Despite a policy of community partnership in forest management in Mozambique, fieldwork in Derre 
Forest Reserve showed that in practice there is very little evidence of communities actually engaging in 
negotiations over concessions, participating in comanagement, or entering partnerships with private 
operators. The only contact with the private sector reported by households in the Forest Reserve, where 
there is a forestry CBNRM project, is occasional casual employment by loggers, though they often bnng 
their own labour gangs. Apart from this, a few individuals involved in the CBNRM programme who are 
setting up as carpenters know something of plans for the community to apply for a forestry licence for 
carpentry timber and have heard of logging operators’ contacts with the chief. But the carpenters are 
not allowed to use the wood where they live inside the reserve, the community’s application for a licence 
was stalled, and the operators’ contact with the chief appears to have been no more than a quick vlsit 
without any form of negotiation. For the majority, their expectations and hopes of forestry in the area 
are to provide temporary jobs. 
The Forestry Act only requires consultation for allocating concessions, not the more common harvesting 
licences; consultation is “listening to” not secunng agreement from and communities themselves cannot 
get concessions. Without either a veto or their own concession, communities will not be in a 
commercially strong negotiating position with a partner. Although communities have a role in co- 
management, power is not actually devolved to community level. 
Source: SLSA Research Papers 10 and 18. 
exert much less leverage vis-d-vis the private sector 
and communities have less influence on the local 
and national government than in South Africa. 
There is thus a wide gap between the legislative 
framework on forestry (which stipulates 
community involvement) and its implementation. 
The Mozambican government is unwilling or 
unable to devolve control to communities, as this 
would severely restnct investment opportunities 
and massively increase administrative burdens. In 
practice, allocating forestry licences and 
concessions as fast as possible is a greater priority 
than insisting on the details of community 
involvement (see Box 5, articles 6 and 7 in this 
Bulletin and SLSA Research Papers 10 and 18). 
4 Ecoregional conservation 
In parallel and overlapping with the emergence, 
particularly from South Africa, of a joint-venture 
business philosophy to exploiting wld resources 
there has been a resurgence in popularity for large- 
scale and top-down conservation initiatives in the 
region. In particular, there has been a sudden flurry 
of interest in what are variously known as 
Transboundary Natural Resource Management 
Areas, Transfrontier Conservation Areas, 
Transfrontier Parks and Peace Parks. In essence, 
these all refer to bi- or tri-lateral agreements on 
conservation initiatives straddling national 
boundanes in the interests of opening up previously 
segmented “ecoregions” to migratory species. Allied 
to ecological arguments is a similar logic to that 
underpinning the private-community joint ventures 
dwussed above, revolvlng around the, potentially 
pro-poor, development potential brought by new 
pnvate sector opportunities for tourism 
development. Economies of scale and regional 
marketing are seen as particularly important benefits 
to attract tourism investment. These are still in the 
early stages of development and have also gained 
mixed reviews. By their very nature these are top- 
down initiatives and there are fears that this will 
result in a retreat from the community participation 
emphasis of prevlous CBNRM initiatives and will 
put conservation, big business and other criteria 
before local livelihoods (see Box 6). 
On a smaller scale, another relatively high-profile 
new conservation initiative proposed for South 
Afnca’s Eastern Cape is the Pondoland National 
Park, or “Pondopark”, intended to preserve a 
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Box 6 The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park 
The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) was formally signed into enstence in 2002. It binds 
Kruger National Park in South Africa, Limpopo Park in Mozambique and Gonarezhou National Park in 
Zimbabwe into what is claimed to be Africa’s largest contiguous wildlife area. 
While the GLTP project documents emphasise the development benefits that will accrue to 
communities, there is little evidence so far that the initiatives will lead to increased roles of residents in 
the tourism industry, or to stronger partnership with the private sector. If anything the reverse may be 
true. There are several different reasons for this. One is that these proposals derive their logic from a 
curious blend of agendas in which community development concerns are a late addition. First and 
foremost they are conservation-orientated initiatives. The rationale for the GLTP revolves around re- 
establishing “ecological integrity” and migration corridors for mega-fauna across national borders and 
has been lobbied for principally by conservation organisations keen for a high-profile flagship project. 
It is also backed by a powerful South African business constituency and three national governments 
who have invested the initiative with a range of symbolic and practical intents ranging from dismantling 
the legacies of apartheid and fostering peace and security to reinvigorating Zimbabwe’s dormant tourist 
industry. 
Community consultation has been negligible and there are widespread fears that the scheme will lead 
to a massive disruption of ensting local livelihoods, without in turn delivering valuable alternative 
livelihood strategies. This is looking all too likely, given that current livelihood activities and resources 
are being given insufficient attention in development plans to date. One effect of the GLTP. for example, 
will be to police more closely the boundanes of Kruger National Park, which is currently a conduit for 
illegal labour migrants from Zimbabwe and Mozambique to South Africa. This transborder labour 
migration and the consequent remittance income are vitally important to livelihoods in the region (see 
article 2 ,  this Bulletin). 
Source: SLSA Research Paper 4. 
biodiversity hotspot” with a high level of influence the form of development in line with 
endemism covering the area from and including 
Mkambati Nature Reserve to Port St Johns (SLSA 
Research Paper 6). This is yet to be established, but 
Box 7 illustrates the opportunities and dangers of 
the scheme by sketching the extreme positive and 
negative scenarios. 
5 Land restitutionlredistribution 
and wild resources management 
As the positive scenano for Pondopark suggests, 
one way in which the balance of power can be 
swung towards communities in private-community 
partnerships is when the community has secured 
land rights in advance of investment. The 
“community”, in this context, is land-owner, lessor 
and contractual partner rather than just employees 
or recipients of chanty. Thus they are better able to 
their own interests by, for example, putting out 
their own tenders to the private sector. 
Where communities have made successful claims 
for land restitution in South African natlonal parks 
and other established protected areas, for example, 
there are emerging precedents for joint tourism 
ventures with the private sector - the Makuleke 
land claim in Kruger is the best known example 
(see article 6, this Bulletin). In the Eastern Cape the 
Dwesa Cwebe community recently won its claim 
over a provincial nature reserve. These land claims 
have only been granted with highly restncted use 
rights that ensure that communities keep the land 
under conservation and tourism usage. The benefit 
to them lies in commercial opportunities from their 
market asset, not in agricultural usage (Reid 2001; 
SLSA Research Paper 8). 
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Box 7: Positive and negative scenarios for Pondopark, South Africa 
The positive scenario 
A process of consultation identifies a park plan that is commercially realistic, and is chosen through 
informed consultation by a majority of residents because of the net opportunities it creates. Thus a new 
type of National Park is established, which combines core zone, multiple use and community-managed 
areas, such that the core biodiversity assets are protected, the subsistence value of community land is 
maintained, and the commercial value of it increased. Zoning is done to minimise opportunity costs of 
lost agncultural land use. Tounsm opportunities are enhanced due to the biodiversity protection and 
regional infrastructure and marketing, thus there is competition among investors. Government uses its 
planning power to select tounsm bids on socio-economic as well as commercial cntena, and also, 
through land reform, shared management bodies or other means, puts commercial assets and decision- 
making power in the hands of local residents. Government, conservationists, tounsm operators, and 
local residents all make comparable compromises over land-uses and permitted developments, so that 
fiscal, conservation, commercial, employment, and developmental goals are all served. A tourism hub 
at Pondopark serves tounsm development in the wider region, such that it becomes a motor of growth 
enabling a range of entrepreneurs to identify and exploit new opportunities, and a substantial source of 
local jobs. The National Park status brings in international investment to fund conservation and 
infrastructure, and provlncial government is able to redeploy its attention and resources to developing 
assets in the Western part of the Wild Coast and Eastern Cape promnce, enjoymg synergy with the Park. 
The negative scenario 
The Pondopark proposal is “approved” by a few chiefs and a couple of other ministnes, then announced 
by the President, at which point back-tracking becomes impossible. The plan is pushed ahead, through 
superficial consultation in which communities are informed of the detail, using NGOs as 
communication and logistical organisation channels and with nothing more than begrudging toleration 
from provincial government. The zonation provides only limited access to resources for local people, 
converts agricultural land into non-farming multiple use land. SANParks tries to set up joint 
management bodies, but lacks the new expertise to truly devolve power Tounsm plans are drawn up 
only by bureaucrats and conservationists. When land claims are won, there is little scope left for 
revenue-generating, job-creating development. When government sites are tendered, private sector 
interest is low, due to design features and low tounsm prospects in the region. Thus development is 
slow and scope for encouragng more equitably structured ventures through tender bidding is minimal. 
With few benefits around, competition for them between local factions intensifies. Opposition to the 
park mounts, increasing tension and riskiness of investment. Tangible benefits remain elusive. 
Provlncial government, havlng watched from the sidelines. seizes a moment to propose alternatives. 
Eventually, there is either a park that struggles along despite the opportunity costs to local livelihoods, 
or a local revolt means that the park is degazetted and planning begins again 
Source: SLSA Research Paper 6. 
However, this constitutes a major opportunity 
cost and there are concerns that the legal 
resolution of the land claims still leaves excessive 
power with conservation authorities, limiting 
commercial opportunities for communities who 
face immense practical problems in establishing 
the legal and technical capacity to develop this 
approach. 
This can be contrasted with emerging ad hoc 
arrangements for wldlife management on newly 
redistributed land in Zimbabwe’s lowveld, where 
the private sector and, to some extent, the 
conservation authonties, have been put on the 
defensive by settlers “self-restituting” land 
belonging to their ancestors. In most cases there 
has been an outnght rejection of wildlife as a 
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Box 8: Indigenous wildlife management in a “former” National Park, Zimbabwe 
A portion of Gonarezhou National Park known as “Section 27” (in a former vetennary corridor) has 
been claimed for resettlement. A total of 50 ha self-contained plots have been allocated to 56 people. 
These are all members of a relatively wealthy and politically well-connected elite including councillors, 
war veterans’ leaders, army personnel, policemen and National Parks staff. Yet none of these people 
have physically relocated to Section 27 The proposal, instead, 1s to operate it as a mini-conservancy: a 
further safan concession where revenues would be disbursed to the 56 landowners. This portion of land 
is strategically a very important one. It would form a corridor linking the rump Gonarezhou National 
Park to game ranches such as the Malilangwe Conservation Trust and the conservancies beyond. These 
56 plot holders envisage benefiting from buying into the Transfrontier Park scheme. 
Source: SLSA Research Paper 1 .  
landuse, as settlers have preferred to hunt “their” 
animals and clear the land for dryland agriculture 
in the absence of enforceable contractual 
obligations to keep the land as wildlife estate. 
Indeed, even part of Gonarezhou National Park, 
supposedly part of the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park, has been returned to 
agnculture. However, there is a proposal to develop 
another part of this park as an “indigenous” 
conservancy (Box 8). 
6 Conclusions 
In southern Afnca, “natural resource management” 
has come to stand not for the processes by which 
people interact with natural resources in their daily 
struggle for livelihoods, but some form of formal 
policy. project or programme for the management 
of natural resources (Murombedzi 2003). This 
research has tried to re-connect with the 
livelihoods concerns and contexts of the poor by 
asking how they get represented in these policies, 
programmes and concepts for the management of 
wild resources in South Africa. Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe. This has raised certain concerns that 
are returned to in Part 111 of this Bulletin. The 
danger is that these policies will constrain more 
than they enable poor people’s access to resources 
and income with the opportunity costs 
outweighing the benefits. Also by priontising 
investment over equity, such schemes are likely to 
benefit local elites, the pnvate sector and the state 
more than the poor (see article 6, this Bulletin). 
Tourism, in particular, often marginalises the poor 
and, as the industryk collapse in Zimbabwe has 
demonstrated, it relies on an inherently fickle (and 
thus risky) client-base As a recent study by DFID 
admits it is ’unlikely that the scale of potential 
impact would make wildlife-based interventions in 
general a priority over, say, those to support 
agriculture-based livelihoods’ (Livestock and 
Wildlife Advisory Group 2002. mi). However, 
where the state is powerful VIS-h-vis the pnvate 
sector (such as where it controls commercially 
competitive sites) and is willing to priontise local 
issues when trade-offs arise and/or communities 
have firm legal or de fact0 nghts over land with 
high commercial value, the new “pro-poor” policies 
for the management of wild resources do hold out 
some hope for improving rural livelihoods. 
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Notes 
* This article draws in particular on SLSA Research 
Papers 4, 6, 7, 8 and 18. The complete list of SLSA 
Research Papers is found on page 116 of this Bulletin 
and full text versions are available at. 
www.ids ac uWslsa. 
Encouragmg partnerships between government and 
the pnvate sector in sustainable development was 
one of the major and most controversial themes of 
the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development. 
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